Bidding games are extensive form games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next. Zero-sum bidding games (also known as Richman games) have been extensively studied, focusing on the fraction of the initial budget that can guaranty the victory of each player [Lazarus et al. 1999; Develin and Payne 2010] .
INTRODUCTION
Are game-theorists better at playing games? Game-theory and game-playing are often considered to be very different things, with distinct purposes and different sets of required skills. Exceptional points of intersection are those games that are both fun to play and posses interesting theoretical properties; among those, a particularly exquisite example is Bidding Chess.
1 Unlike standard Chess where turns are alternating among white and black, in the bidding version players each start with a fixed budget, and bid at the beginning of each turn to determine who gets to play. It is thus possible that a player will move e.g. 3 pieces before the other player makes a single move. Yet one needs to carefully balance the bids for the different moves, or else she could lose too much of her budget, leaving her unable to take advantage of her posi-1 For rules and historical background, see http://users.math.yale.edu/∼sp547/pdf/BiddingChess.pdf.
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These bidding variations of popular recreational games are special cases of a wider class of games known as Richman Games: A Richman game consists of a directed graph of states (e.g. board states of the Chess game), where states without outgoing edges are either "white" or "black," assigning victory to the corresponding player. The game starts from some initial node with initial budget allocation, and in each turn players bid for the right to play next. The highest bidder pays the lower bidder, and chooses a directed edge to follow, until either a white or black terminal is reached. Richman games have been formally studied by Lazarus et al. [1999] and later by Develin and Payne [2010] . See Related Work for more details on Richman games and other variations of bidding games.
However, a zero-sum game with bidding phases is still a zero-sum game, and to the best of our knowledge, bidding games with general utility functions have not been previously studied. In this work, we extend the model to general-sum two player games by adding bidding phases to an arbitrary extensive form game. Whereas zero-sum games have a value that each player can guaranty, when extending the definition to general-sum games we can only talk about equilibrium, and a natural solution concept to look at is pure subgame-perfect equilibrium (PSPE). Indeed, the purpose of this work is to study the existence and properties of PSPE in (non zero-sum) bidding games.
2
Other than the pure theoretical interest in such results, many social and economic interactions can be formalized as two-player extensive form games. For example, we can consider two agents bargaining over a set of heterogeneous items. Then any sequential bargaining protocol is in fact an extensive form game (with complete information), where the utilities for players are the respective values of the subsets of items they get in the end. Indeed, several bargaining and arbitration protocols have been suggested in the literature, some of them of a sequential nature (see Related Work). We can thus use bidding phases as above to design a new sequential scrip bargaining (SSB) mechanism: The agents each start with some fixed budget (reflecting their relative power or entitlement), and use this budget to bid over items auctioned in some order. It is natural to ask e.g. whether the equilibrium outcomes of SSB correspond to efficient and/or fair allocations.
Our contribution. We first show that under a mild assumption on tie-breaking, every bidding game admits at least one PSPE. Further, there is a particular natural PSPE, termed the Lower PSPE, that can be derived by a simple backward induction process.
Our main result is that in any bidding game over a binary tree (when at every stage of the game there are two possible actions), the Lower PSPE admits three desirable properties: (a) players' utility is weakly monotone in their budget; (b) a Pareto-efficient outcome is reached for any initial budget; and (c) for any Pareto-efficient outcome there is an initial budget s.t. this outcome is attained. As a complementary result, we show that in bidding games on a non-binary tree, none of the properties above is guaranteed, and all PSPE outcomes may be non-monotone and arbitrarily bad for both players.
We formally analyze the properties of the SSB mechanism described above, when applied to combinatorial bargaining problems. As a direct corollary from our main theorem, we get that the mechanism guarantees a Pareto-efficient allocation for any valuation functions agents have over subsets of items. We further show that the allocation is fair in the sense that an agent with a fraction of X% of the total budget prefers her allocation to X% of the possible allocations, a criterion known as minimal satisfaction test [De Clippel et al. 2012] .
Our result can be applied not just to item allocation problems, but also to other domains where two agents have combinatorial preferences over outcomes, including multi-issue voting [Lang and Xia 2009] and selection of arbitrators [De Clippel et al. 2012] . Implications of our main result extend to other games such as the Nash bargaining game and Centipede games.
Finally, we prove that any binary bidding game can be solved in time that is polynomial in the number of states, and show how such an algorithm can be used to efficiently find a PSPE in SSBs with additive valuations and other succinct classes.
Omitted proofs, along with our fast algorithm, examples, and further discussion, can be found in the full version of this paper (http://arxiv.org/pdf/1311.0913).
MODEL
For an integer k, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k} by [k] . Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, we assume that N = {1, 2}, i.e. that there are only two competing agents. We use the notation −i (instead of 3 − i) to denote the player that is not i. We name player 1 the white player, and player 2 the black player.
Bidding games
Definition 2.1. An extensive form game structure for two players is a tuple G = N, S, s 0 , T, g 1 , g 2 , u 1 , u 2 , where:
-N = {1, 2} is the set of players (sometimes called agents or bidders); -S is a set of game states; -s 0 ∈ S is an initial state; -T ⊆ S is a set of terminal states; -g i : (S \ T ) → 2 S defines the valid moves of player i in state s ∈ S \ T ; -u i : T → R defines the utility for player i is terminal t ∈ T .
We make the following assumptions about the transition functions g i . First, unless specified otherwise, we assume that there are no cycles. Formally, there is no sequence s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k where s k = s 1 and s j+1 ∈ g 1 (s j ) ∪ g 2 (s j ) for all j < k. Second, unless specified otherwise, we assume that in every non-terminal state both players can play. Formally, that g i (s) = ∅ for all i ∈ N, s ∈ S \ T . The utility function u i induces a complete preference order over terminals T . We denote t i t whenever u i (t) ≥ u i (t ). Given a game structure G and s ∈ S, we denote by G| s the subgame of G rooted in s. The height of s is the maximal distance between s and a leaf t ∈ T (G| s ). In particular, height(G) = height(s 0 ).
The following two properties of bidding games are structural properties of the underlying game tree/DAG: Definition 2.2. A bidding game G is symmetric, if g 1 (s) = g 2 (s) for all s ∈ S. That is, if the same set of moves is available to both players in every state.
Unless specified otherwise, all bidding games in this paper are symmetric. In symmetric games we only need to specify one transition function g(s).
Playing the game. In order to complete the definition of the game, we also need a method to determine who plays at every turn. Traditionally, there is a turn function that assigns the current player for every state (e.g., alternating turns). Another way is to randomly select the current player in each turn, as in [Peres et al. 2007] . In this work we follow the bidding framework of [Lazarus et al. 1999; Develin and Payne 2010] , where each player has an initial budget B i ∈ R + that is used for the bidding.
In each turn (suppose at state s), each player submits a bid b i ≤ B i , and "next state" s * i ∈ (s), which is realized in case i wins the round. We break ties in favor of player 1. More formally, a strategy of i in G is composed of a pair s * i , b i for every s ∈ S \ T , and every B i . We require that b i ≤ B i , and that s * i ∈ g(s), otherwise this is not a valid strategy.
Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, bids can be real numbers. It is also possible to think of games where bids (and budgets) are restricted to integers, and we will consider this variation in Section 4.2. We denote by B the set of possible budget partitions (which are also the allowable bids). When bids are continuous, we will assume w.l.o.g. that there is one unit of budget allocated to players, i.e. that B 1 + B 2 = 1. Since in either case the total budget is fixed, B 2 can always be inferred from B 1 and vice versa. We therefore use either B 1 or B 2 to denote a particular budget partition.
Example-Majority. Consider the following (zero-sum) game G maj , depicted in Figure 1. In this game there are three turns, and the winner is the player which plays at least twice. Formally, S = {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1, 2} is simply the number of times that each player played, s 0 = (0, 0);
and u i (t) = 1 iff t i = 2 and 0 otherwise.
Note that if G maj is played with alternating turns and without budgets or bidding, the white player can always win. Consider G maj with B 1 = B 2 = 0.5, i.e. where each player has an initial budget of 0.5. Note that a higher budget makes it easier to win in this game. For example, if B i > 3B −i for some player, then player i can always gain the first two rounds.
Subgame perfect equilibria
We will denote by γ a strategy profile for the two players, where γ(s, B 1 ) is the part of the profile that determines the actions taken in state s under budget partition (B 1 , B 2 ).
We interpret the notation i > as ≥ when i = 1 and as > when i = 2. While the following definition is somewhat lengthy, it coincides with the standard definition of PSPE for the game described above. We write down explicitly all possible deviations of each player and explain them in comments.
Definition 2.4 (PSPE). A pure subgame perfect equilibrium (PSPE) in a bidding game G, is a mapping γ from states to actions, s.t. each player plays a best-response strategy to the other player at any subtree, for any budget. Formally,
where for γ(s, B 1 ) = (i, b 1 , b 2 , B * i , s * i , t), the following hold (we denote by γ(·) T ∈ T the terminal reached in this subtree):
• i = 1 if b 1 ≥ b 2 and otherwise i = 2. That is, highest bidder takes the round with ties broken in favor of white.
That is, the next state is optimal for the winner (given her remaining budget).
That is, we reach to the same terminal from this state and from the next state (consistency).
. That is, the winner i cannot benefit by using a different bid and still take the turn.
That is, i cannot gain by lowering her bid and dropping the turn (does not apply if i = 1 and b 2 = 0).
• For any s −i and any
That is, −i cannot gain by increasing his bid and take the turn.
We emphasize that a PSPE determines the actions and outcome for any budget partition in any internal node, and in particular for any initial budget partition. Therefore, every PSPE γ for G induces a mapping µ γ from B to outcomes T (G). That is,
EXISTENCE OF PSPE
We start by showing the following basic result. THEOREM 3.1. Algorithm 1 computes a PSPE of G.
We show that Algorithm 1 computes a particular PSPE called the Lower PSPE. We provide here the proof outline. Some fine details about the continuous case are explained in the full version.
Intuitively, the algorithm traverses the game tree from the leaves upwards. By induction, at any level of the tree it is known exactly what would be the utilities at any child for any remaining budget, thus at each node we can think of the agents as playing a normal-form game, where the actions are all valid bids, and the utilities are the utilities of the best child for the winner under the remaining budgets. At any node the algorithm simulates an ascending auction for the turn, where agents start by bidding 0, and then both agents get repeated opportunities to raise their bid. Eventually, the algorithm records who won in this node for every possible budget and the utilities of both players (to be used by nodes up the tree).
Crucially, an agent only increments her bid by the minimal amount that strictly improves her utility (in multiples of in the continuous case). We show that under this process no agent ever wants to decrease her bid and thus convergence is reached when no agent wants (or able) to further increase her bid.
In the continuous case we must also show that no agent would want to increase by less than after the process above converges. This turns out to be non-trivial and strongly related to the tie-breaking method being used.
Initialize tables A1, A2, T * of size |S| × |B|; In every leaf t, assign T * (t, B) = t for all B ∈ B; for every node s in post-order do for every budget partition B1 ∈ B: do b1 ← 0; b2 ← 0 ; // Initialize both bids repeat // Compute outcome under current bids:
// I.e., continue as long as some player can deviate until; // Write down the equilibrium strategies for s:
Tie-breaking. We emphasize that while the assumption on consistent tie-breaking is not required in the discrete case, it cannot be relaxed in the continuous case. If ties are decided differently in different states, then there may not be a PSPE. Further, a subgame perfect equilibrium may not exist even if mixed strategies are allowed (see Section 7.3 regarding random tie-breaking). PROPOSITION 3.2. There is a zero-sum game with state-specific tie breaking, that has no subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Genericity and uniqueness
Generic games are games where agents have strict preferences over all outcomes. In classical extensive-form games (without bidding), it is known that genericity entails the existence of a unique PSPE. However in our game there are simultaneous steps, and thus genericity may not be sufficient for uniqueness. See full version for details.
Enforcing generic preferences. In the general case, it is possible that a player is indifferent between two outcomes t, t ∈ T . In such cases, we will assume that the player has a strict preference towards the outcome that is also better for the other player. Thus every player has a strict preference order over all distinct outcomes. Recall that t i t means that player i strictly prefers t over t . Thus in the remainder of the paper,
We highlight that this behavioral assumption only increases the number of potential deviations from a given state, and thus only narrows the set of PSPEs in a game.
Ascending auctions and uniqueness. While a bidding game may have multiple PSPEs, we can maintain a unique equilibrium by changing the rules of the auction. 4 Indeed, suppose that instead of a sealed-bid auction in every step, we hold an ascending auction (similar to an English auction), where in each step the price rise by = 2 −height(G)−2 and the loser has a chance to accept the new price and becomes a winner. Since this is essentially equivalent to the auction being simulated in Algorithm 1, this always results in the Lower PSPE. COROLLARY 3.3. Any generic bidding game G with the above ascending auction rule has a unique PSPE, which is the Lower PSPE of G. This also holds in non-generic games where players weakly prefer outcomes with higher social welfare.
EFFICIENCY, MONOTONICITY, AND BINARY TREES
Having established the (rather weak) conditions for existence of a PSPE, we next turn to study the properties of this outcome, how it depends on the budget, and whether it is desired from the perspective of the players. This is the primary section of this work, where we lay out our main positive result. A PSPE γ is monotone, if µ γ (B 1 ) 1 µ γ (B 1 ) whenever B 1 > B 1 , and likewise for player 2.
Let
A PSPE γ is Pareto-surjective, if for all t ∈ T P (G), there is some budget B 1 ∈ B, s.t. µ γ (B 1 ) = t.
Intuitively, our main result is that binary games always have a highly desirable PSPE, which has all the above properties. We will first show that if the game is not binary, none of these properties is guaranteed. Violating Pareto-surjective is trivial (just consider a root with three children, whose payoffs are (1, 3), (2, 2),and (3, 1)).
PROPOSITION 4.1. There is a (non-binary) bidding game, where every PSPE violates monotonicity and Pareto-optimality.
PROOF. Consider G bad (Fig. 2) under budget B 2 = 0. Clearly white can play at will, and thus the only PSPE leads to the outcome (10, 7) (marked). Denote by B 1 (x) the budget at node x. Note that if players reach x, then the outcome will be (10, 7) if B 1 (x) ≥ 0.75 and otherwise (0, 9). Now suppose that B 1 = 0.8, B 2 = 0.2. If black takes the first round, he will choose (1, 8), since by choosing x we will have B 1 (x) ≥ B 1 = 0.8 > 0.75. In order to get to (10, 7), white has to get to x with at least 0.75, that is to bid b 1 ≤ 0.05. However if b 1 < 0.2 = B 2 , then black will overbid and take the turn. Thus in every PSPE white must bid at least b 1 = 0.2 in s 0 , and play (2, 1). This contradicts both monotonicity and Pareto: the utility of black dropped from 7 to 1 when his budget increased from 0 to 0.2, and (1, 2) is Pareto-dominated by (10, 7).
Binary bidding games
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the proof of our main theorem: THEOREM 4.2. Let G be a binary bidding game. Then its Lower PSPE γ is (A) monotone, (B) Pareto-optimal, and (C) Pareto-surjective.
For convenience, we will denote by γ| s the projection of γ on a subgame of G that is rooted in s. Similarly, µ| s = µ γ|s . We will sometimes use the budget of player 2 as the input for µ, rather than the budget of player 1. This should be clear from the notation. That is, µ(B 1 ) and µ(B 2 ) always refer to the same outcome in T (G).
Denote the two children of s 0 by s l , s r . As the proof of all parts is in induction on the height of G, we assume that γ has been computed on both subtrees G l = G| s l and G r = G| sr , and denote γ l = γ| s l , γ r = γ| sr . Similarly for µ l , µ r . By the induction hypothesis both of γ l , γ r have properties (A),(B) and (C). PROOF. By induction in each subtree we have a monotone PSPE γ l , γ r . Thus if a player can gain by increasing her bid, it is sufficient to raise by the minimal amount , as this will leave the winner with a higher budget.
We now turn to complete the proof of our main theorem.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2A (MONOTONICITY). By the induction hypothesis, both of µ l , µ r are monotone. Also, by the Pareto property (B), µ(B) ∈ T P (G) for all B. Let B 1 = B 1 + , and let b 1 , b 2 be the equilibrium bids in γ(s 0 , B 1 ). Likewise, b 1 , b 2 are the equilibrium bids in γ(s 0 , B 1 ).
We prove first for the case where white takes (
If either player had a deviation then the same deviation would apply in γ(s 0 , B 1 ). In either case,
Next, we prove for the case where black takes, in which
) and we are done.
Suppose
. By monotonicity of µ r , this is at least as good as µ r (B 1 + b 2 ) = t r = µ(B 1 ).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2B (PARETO-OPTIMAL). Let b 1 , b 2 be equilibrium bids in s 0 reached by the above process. We use throughout the proof the fact that by monotonicity of both subgames, it only makes sense for a player to raise her bid if she selects the branch that is not currently played. Note that we may not use the fact that µ itself is monotone, since the proof of (A) relies on the proof of (B).
Assume w.l.o.g. that b 1 = b 2 (white takes) and that under budget B 1 − b 1 , white prefers s l . We argue that t * l = µ l (B 1 − b 1 ) is Pareto-efficient in G. Assume, toward a contradiction, that there is some t * r ∈ T P (G r ) that Pareto dominates t * l (i.e., t * r 1,2 t * l ). By induction on (C), t * r = µ r (B 1 ) for some budget B Case 2:
. That is, white prefers s r but chose s l . A contradiction.
Thus suppose b 1 > 0, and we will show that this will lead to a contradiction.
we must have by monotonicity of µ r that 0 ≤ b ≤ b 1 . By the construction of the equilibrium bids, white strictly preferred t * l = µ l (B 1 − b 1 ) over the previous state µ r (B 1 + b 2 ) = µ r (B 1 + b 1 ) (where the bid of player 1 was strictly lower). Thus t * r
r , which is a contradiction.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2C (PARETO-SURJECTIVE). We prove by induction on the height of the tree G. For height 0 it is obvious. For height 1 either one leaf weakly Pareto-dominates the other, in which case this leaf is reached in µ regardless of budgets, or each player has a favorite leaf in which case both leafs are Pareto-efficient.
Let t * ∈ T P (G), we need to show that there is some initial budget B ∈ B s.t. that µ(B) = t * . W.l.o.g. t * ∈ T P (G l ). By induction on property (C), let B * 1 s.t. µ l (B * 1 ) = t * , and let t * r = µ r (B * 1 ). We set B * 1 s.t. by slightly increasing or decreasing the budget, the outcome will not change (i.e. it is not on the edge of its respective interval). Formally, for the used in Algorithm 1,
; and likewise for µ r . Since the size of budget intervals is 2 −height(G) , setting < 2 −height(G)−2 is sufficient. We know that t * r does not strictly Pareto dominate t * (as t * ∈ T P (G)), thus either t * r ≺ 1 t * or t * r ≺ 2 t * . Case I: Both players prefer t * over t * r at budget B * 1 . We claim that the equilibrium bids are b 1 = b 2 = 0.
Suppose that black raises to b > b 2 = 0, takes the round and goes right. then
and thus black does not gain. Therefore b 1 = b 2 = 0, and µ(B . We will show that the equilibrium in s 0 is b 1 = b 2 = b * . As long as bids are strictly below b * , the resulting budget is in the "conflict zone" [B 2 , B * 2 ], and the lowest bidder will raise to take the turn from the other bidder. Suppose now that b 1 = b 2 = b * . IfB 2 = 0, then b 2 = b * = B * 2 and black cannot raise. Otherwise, by definition of b * if black raises his bid to 
I.e., white will raise her bid to b 1 = b 2 .
Similarly, if b 1 = b 2 ≤ b * , then white selects s r , but black wants to raise to
It remains to show that b 2 = b 1 + = b * + is an equilibrium, i.e. that white will not raise. This is exactly as in case II. Either white cannot raise, or b 1 > b * . In the latter case, µ r (B 1 − b 1 ) 1 µ r (B 1 − b * − ) = µ r (B 1 − ) 1 t * , where the last inequality is by definition ofB 1 . Thus white cannot gain by selecting s r , and clearly not by keeping s l at a lower budget.
Discrete bidding games
Consider bidding games where the bids and budgets are integers, and the total budget is some M ∈ N. Which results still go through and which results change? When considering existence, we showed in Section 3 that a PSPE exists whether bids are continuous or discrete, and in fact the proof for the discrete case is easier.
How about Pareto-optimality? If M ≥ 2 height(G)+2 , then we effectively simulate the continuous case, since the budget interval {0, 1, . . . , M } can be partitioned to 2 height(G) sub-intervals whose size is at least 3, and the exact budget within each sub-interval has no effect on the outcome. Thus Theorem 4.2 holds in the discrete case when M is sufficiently high (i.e., exponential in the height of the game tree). If M is too low, this is no longer true. See full version for a proof and more details. PROPOSITION 4.4. For any k ∈ N there is a binary bidding game G k , s.t. if G k is played with a discrete budget of M < 2 k , it has no Pareto-optimal PSPE.
IMPLICATIONS
There are two ways we can think of bidding games. First, we can look for games that inherently have budgets and sequential bidding, and there are some examples of scenarios that arguably fit into this model, typically the incentive structure and/or the bidding structure is quite different (see Section 5.4 below, and the Related work section). A more promising way is to think of the sequential bidding process as a mechanism that is designed to increase cooperation and welfare among a pair of players in various scenarios.
Sequential scrip bargaining
Definition 5.1. A sequential scrip bargaining (SSB) is a tuple F = N, K, (v i ) i∈N , τ , where: N = {1, 2} is the set of bidders; K is the set of items (k = |K|); v i : 2 K → R is the value function of agent i ∈ N ; and τ is a permutation over items K.
Intuitively, items K are offered for sale according to order τ , and in each turn agents bid for the current item. To complete the game we need to describe the bidding rules. As expected, we assign a budget B i to each agent; the highest bidder in each turn pays her bid to the other agents, and decides who gets the item. In case of a tie we treat agent 1 as the winner.
This bargaining mechanism seems like a close reminiscent of sequential auctions. However, typically in the auction literature items are auctioned in a first-or secondprice auction where the highest bidder pays the (first or second) bid to the seller; and utilities are quasi-linear. In particular, an agent's utility depends not just on the allocation, but also on the amount of money the agent paid for her items [Blumrosen and Nisan 2007] (see also Related Work).
SSBs differ from these standard auctions in two ways. First, while we use the firstprice auction rule, the higher bidder pays the other player, rather than paying to the seller, highlighting that this is a bargaining mechanism rather than an auction. Second and more importantly, the budget B i is "scrip money" and has no value outside the game, thus the utility of i from a bundle S i ⊆ K is v i (S i ), regardless of how much of the budget the agent spent.
SSBs are Binary Bidding Games
PROPOSITION 5.2. Every SSB with k items has an equivalent bidding game over a binary tree of height k, and vice versa.
While the proof is in the full version, it is not hard to see why this is true. Intuitively, we can describe any SSB as a binary tree where any internal node at depth k corresponds to an allocation of the first k items. Then taking the left branch means white takes the next item, whereas right branch means the item goes to black. In the other direction, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the binary three is complete. Then we identify each of the 2 k leaves of the tree with an allocation of the k items. For example, the game G maj (Sec. 2.1) coincides with a sequential scrip bargaining over three identical items, where each agent assigns a value of 1 to bundles of size two or more, and 0 otherwise.
Since SSBs are essentially equivalent to bidding games on binary trees, an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.2 and Prop. 5.2 is the following. For a set of items K, let T P (K) be the set of Pareto-efficient allocations of K among two players. THEOREM 5.3. Let F = N, K, (v i ) i∈N , τ be a sequential scrip bargaining game (with two players). Then there is a PSPE γ in F s.t. µ = µ γ is a monotone and surjective mapping from B to T P (K).
As we mentioned in the introduction, the set of items K need not be a collection of physical items. We next consider some applications of SSBs with "virtual items."
Applications for SSB mechanisms
Multi-issue voting. Consider a set of voters, voting over n binary issues [Winter 1997; Lacy and Niou 2000; Lang and Xia 2009] . Here the voters (who are the players) have a complete (weak) preference order over the 2 n outcomes, but need not attribute cardinal utilities to them. It is known that when preferences are unrestricted, either truthful or strategic voting may lead to the selection of a Pareto-dominated outcome. Voting on the issues sequentially provides a partial solution, but Pareto-dominated outcomes may still be selected [Lacy and Niou 2000] . While our model only applies for two voters, it provides strong guaranties of Pareto-efficiency, regardless of the agenda or the structure of preferences. In particular, a Condorcet loser is never selected, and the Condorcet winner is always selected if it exists.
Arbitration. For two self-interested parties, a bidding game can be used as an arbitration mechanism that reaches an efficient outcome, and also allows a natural way to take into account parties of different importance, or weight. As a concrete example, we can think of the Democrats and the GOP bargaining over the various clauses of the Health Act, or some other reform. The initial budget of each party can be set, say, based on its number of seats. Arbitration mechanisms for two parties (not necessarily in a combinatorial setting) have been widely studied in the literature [Sprumont 1993; Anbarci 2006; De Clippel et al. 2012] .
The minimal satisfaction test (MST) [De Clippel et al. 2012 ] is an ordinal fairness criterion, that is satisfied if the selected outcome is above the median outcome in every player's preference order. That is, every player weakly prefers the selected outcome to at least half of all possible outcomes. De Clippel et al. studied several sequential mechanisms, and showed that three of them-The Alternate-Strike mechanism [Anbarci 2006] , the Voting by Alternating Voters and Vetoes mechanism [Sprumont 1993] , and the Shortlisting mechanism-each implement some Pareto-efficient outcome that satisfies MST.
SSB and fair arbitration mechanisms. Consider the following parametrized extension of the MST requirement. We say that an outcome t satisfies the (α 1 , α 2 )-satisfaction test, if each player i weakly prefers t to at least α i |T | outcomes.
PROPOSITION 5.4. Let G be a bidding game over a full binary tree, then any PSPE outcome satisfies the (B 1 , B 2 )-satisfaction test.
In particular, for equal budget we get that the outcome satisfies the minimal satisfaction test of De Clippel at al. [2012] .
The SSB mechanism has the additional property of implementing the entire set of Pareto-efficient outcomes. As the proposition shows, every such outcome that is attained under a given budget allocation, satisfies the parametrized MST. Thus SSB may be considered as a desirable mechanism for selecting arbitrators when the playing parties are asymmetric.
Zero-sum games. In a zero-sum game, player 1 gets an outcome that beats B 1 |T | outcomes, if and only if player 2 gets an outcome that beats B 2 |T | outcomes. Thus by Prop. 5.4 the set of outcomes and the utility functions define the (unique) PSPE outcome completely, regardless of the tree structure.
Communication complexity. In combinatorial settings (such multi-item allocation or multi-issue voting) the SSB mechanism has an additional practical advantage over other mechanisms in terms of communication complexity. The Alternate-Strike mechanism and the Voting by Alternating Voters and Vetoes mechanism [Sprumont 1993; Anbarci 2006 ] both require a number of rounds that is linear in the total number of outcomes. The Shortlisting mechanism [De Clippel et al. 2012 ] only has two rounds, but requires the first player to specify some subset that includes half of the outcomes. As the number of outcomes is exponential in the number of items/issues, all three mechanisms result in exponential communication complexity, and are thus impractical for combinatorial settings.
In contrast, under the SSB mechanism, every player is only required to make a number of decisions that is linear in the number of items/issues, and each decision includes a bid and a binary choice. Thus even if agents are unable to accurately compute the equilibrium strategies, we can still use the mechanism, without efficiency guarantees, for large combinatorial games.
7 Thus to the best of our knowledge, the SSB mechanism (with equal budgets) is the first mechanism that guarantees both Pareto efficiency and MST (under equilibrium play) with low communication complexity (always). As we show on Section 6, for some classes of combinatorial games we can even compute the equilibrium efficiently.
Multi-agent pathfinding. A widely-studied problem in multi-agent systems, is that of finding paths that take a number of agents from their source locations to their targets [Silver 2005; Sharon et al. 2012] . As paths may intersect, the agents affect one another, and self-interested agents may choose paths that severely delay other agents [Bnaya et al. 2013; Amir et al. 2015] . We can think of this problem as an allocation of space-time segments among the agents. For two agents, the SSB mechanism guarantees that the agents will settle on paths that are Pareto-efficient.
Other games
Consider any (symmetric) game in tree-form. If the tree is not binary, we can modify it by recursively breaking decision nodes to a subtree of binary decisions. Then we can divide a large or continuous budget among the players, and let them play the new bidding game. If players adhere to the Lower PSPE, then the initial budget partition will determine the final outcome (from T P (G)). Thus we can get a good outcome even in games where playing by turns would lead to a poor outcome. In particular, with proper initial budgets we can implement the outcome with as maximum social welfare, maximum Egalitarian welfare, etc.
Centipede games. One class of games that falls under the conditions of Theorem 4.2, is that of Centipede games [Rosenthal 1981] . Such games are a notorious example to how rationality leads players to end up in poor outcomes. Under random turn there are still Centipede games where players always choose to finish early, even though staying in the game is eventually significantly better for both.
Nevertheless, in our game setting there is a PSPE where players are guaranteed to continue until they reach one of the Pareto-efficient outcomes (the last two leaves).
Nash bargaining game. The Nash bargaining game [Nash 1950 ] for two players is typically described by a (convex) set of feasible outcomes F in the plane, whose boundary forms the Pareto-efficient frontier, and a status-quo point q. Given F and q, we can think of an extensive-form bargaining game, where players start from q and at each state (point of the grid) they can either "go right" (increase the utility of player 1) or "go up" (increase the utility of player 2). The terminal states are the outcomes along the Pareto frontier. In this case it is clear that every outcome is Pareto (as this is how we defined the terminal states), but the properties of monotonicity and Pareto-surjective are still interesting. The (unique) PSPE induces a generalized solution concept for the Nash bargaining game (a point on the Pareto frontier for any budget allocation).
A natural question is how the PSPE solution-in particular for the case of equal budgets-compares with other solution concepts such as the Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution [Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975] . Since the SSB induced by a Nash bargaining game is zero-sum (always selects an outcome on the Pareto frontier), it follows from Proposition 5.4 that when the budget is equally partitioned, the realized outcome is reached when players make the same number of moves. In other words, if we normalize q to the origin (0, 0), then both players have the same utility (or the closest approximation to same utility), which coincides with the Egalitarian, or proportional, solution [Kalai 1977 ].
COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES
From the computer science perspective, a natural question regarding Algorithm 1 is its computational complexity. In a naïve implementation, we would write any auction with k items as a complete (balanced) binary tree. Then we would traverse the game tree once, and update the strategy tables for every possible budget.
The number of states is |S| = 2 k+1 − 1, and the required budget resolution is = Θ(1/ exp(height(G))) = Θ(2 −k ). Thus the runtime of the naïve algorithm is Θ(|S| −1 ) = Θ(2 k ), i.e. exponential in the number of items. In the general case this is in a sense inevitable, since the description of the valuation functions itself might be exponential in k. However, many valuation functions have succinct representation, and we would like to at least be able to efficiently compute a PSPE in those cases.
We approach this computational challenge by identifying two separate problems. the first problem is to compile a given valuation function into a succinct bidding game representation. That is, to construct either a tree or a DAG with |S| = poly(k). As noted above, this is not always possible but we will show in Section 6.1 how to construct succinct DAGs for some broad classes of auctions. The second, more fundamental problem, is to efficiently compute a PSPE in time polynomial in |S|, regardless of the height. Interestingly, there is a solution that works for arbitrary binary bidding games. PROPOSITION 6.1. Let G be a binary bidding game. The Lower PSPE γ can be computed in time |S| · poly(|T |) = poly(|S|).
As an outline for the proof, we explain why γ has a polynomial size representation. In each state s ∈ S, there is a step function, where in each interval we can write down the equilibrium as a mapping to the next state that each player would choose, and to the outcome that would be attained. The number of intervals in this function is at most 2 height(s) , which can still be exponential in |S|. However due to monotonicity (Theorem 4.2), the actual number of intervals is at most |T | ≤ |S| (in fact at most |T P (G)|, since every outcome may occur only once. It is left to show how this step function can be efficiently computed by backward induction, which is detailed in the full version.
Succinct Value Representations
We next briefly explain how to take some succinct valuation classes, and compile them to a bidding game with a small DAG. See full version for more details.
Additive and weight-based valuations. We first solve a simple case, where valuations are additive, i.e., v i (S) = j∈S v i (j). A corresponding bidding game can be constructed using a dynamic programming technique, similar to the one used for Knapsack. PROPOSITION 6.2. Given an additive SSB F with integer valuations, there is an equivalent bidding game with |S| ≤ (v 1 (K) + 1) × (v 2 (K) + 1). Further, such a bidding game can be constructed efficiently.
Intuitively, we assign a state s m1,m2 for every partial assignment where agent i has items of total value m i . We then connect states that differ by the value of a single item.
A similar technique can be applied in games where the valuations are not additive, but still based on some additive notion of weight. We say that v i is weight-based if every item has a fixed weight w j , and there is a function f i : N → R, s.t. v i (S) = f i ( j∈S w j ). Note that without further constraints any function is weight-based, as we can make sure that each bundle has a different total weight. Weight-based valuations have a bidding game representation with at most w(K) 2 states. This idea can be further generalized to value that depends on several different quantities. As a concrete example, suppose that the items are computing machines, each with some properties like storage, memory, bandwidth, etc. The value of a set of machines to a client depends only on the total storage, total memory, and total bandwidth, regardless of how these resources are allocated across the machines.
As a corollary from Proposition 6.1, a PSPE in weight-based and in additive SSBs can be computed efficiently. That is, in time that is polynomial in the number of items and in the total weight/value (and exponential in the number of dimensions).
Voting with single peaked preferences. If voters have a strict preference order over all 2 k possible outcomes of the game, there cannot be a succinct representation, since we will need 2 k terminals. However consider a scenario, where each voter as an "ideal" point t * i ∈ {0, 1} k . The utility of any other outcome only depends on its distance from t * i , i.e. on the number of coordinates in which t, t * i differ (possibly assigning different weights to different coordinates). This scenario is a special case of an SSB with additive valuations, where the items are the coordinates on which the two voters disagree.
Pathfinding. The items in a pathfinding problem over a graph, are pairs s = location, time . In a naïve representation, all pairs would be allocated, and the value of a bundle of pairs to an agent, would be the optimal legal path from source to target that this bundle contains. If our game states would each represent a subset of such pairs, we would quickly reach an exponential blowup. However, it turns out that with a somewhat different representation, we can construct a bidding game with a most M axT ime 2 × |locations| 4 states.
DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
We presented a simple and intuitive mechanism-sequential scrip bargaining-that implements the full range of Pareto-efficient allocations of items to two agents with arbitrary valuation functions. Further, our mechanism can be applied to efficiently and fairly settle other combinatorial bargaining problems that involve two parties.
Related Work
Richman games. Lazarus et al. [1996; 1999] were the first to systematically analyze bidding variations of zero-sum games. They coined the term "Richman games" in honor of David Ross Richman, the original inventor, and considered games with an infinitely divisible unit of budget. A Richman game is a directed graph (possibly with cycles) with two terminal nodes (say, black and white), and a full play is a path starting from some node and ending in a terminal node. The goal of each player is to end the game in her own terminal. The main focus of Lazarus et al. was on the following question: "in every node, what is the minimal fraction of the budget that will guarantee a victory for the white player?" The Richman function assigns a unique value to every node R(s), which is the average of the Richman values of its lowest and highest neighbors (normalizing the values of white and black terminals to 0 and 1, respectively). Lazarus et al. show that the Richman function exists on every graph and is also unique if the graph is finite. It turns out that R(s) marks the critical budget: if B 1 > R(s) then white can force a victory when starting from node s; if B 1 < R(s) then black can force a victory. Moreover, R(s) is also the exact probability that black wins in a game where instead of bidding, the player in each turn is selected by a fair coin toss (see [Peres et al. 2007] for more details on random-turn games).
Lazarus et al. further study other variations of bidding games by applying different auction rules. In particular, in the Poorman game the highest bidder pays the bank rather than to the other player, so the total budget shrinks with every step. Develin and Payne [2010] extended the theory of zero-sum bidding games in several important aspects. In most recreational games, such as Tic-Tac-Toe, Chess, and Checkers, white and black can perform different actions when in the same board state s, thus games are not necessarily symmetric. Develin and Payne showed that previous results of Lazarus et al. go through even in asymmetric games. In addition, they considered discrete bids, and the implications of various tie-breaking schemes. To demonstrate their approach, Develin and Payne showed a complete solution of bidding Tic-Tac-Toe for every possible initial budget. Interestingly, in the continuous case the Richman value of the initial state in Tic-Tac-Toe is 133/256 ≡ 0.519, which means that an advantage of ∼ 4% in the initial budget is sufficient to guarantee a victory.
Negotiations and bargaining. In typical bargaining problems there is a conflict deal that is implemented if agents cannot reach agreement [Nash 1950 ], or utility depends on time until agreement [Rubinstein 1982; Fatima et al. 2004 ]. In our mechanism there is no conflict deal and thus it is hard to compare the protocols directly. Yet, our Lower PSPE can be intuitively thought of as a combinatorial version of the minimal sufficient concession principle, that is often employed by agents in the monotonic concession protocol [Zlotkin and Rosenschein 1996] : at every node the winner makes the minimal concession (in terms of future bargaining power) that allows her to win the round.
Sequential combinatorial auctions. "Standard" sequential auctions (with quasilinear utilities rather than budgets) have been studied by several researchers [Gale and Stegeman 2001; Rodriguez 2009; Leme et al. 2012] . These papers focused on particular classes of value functions (unit-demand, submodular, etc.) and generally demonstrated that while pure equilibria exist, they may be substantially inefficient for some of these classes. Inefficient outcomes occur even in 2-buyer, complete information auctions [Bae et al. 2007 ].
Sequential Colonel Blotto. In another recent paper, Powell [2009] models a particular sequential game between an attacker and a defender (a sequential Colonel Blotto game). This game is essentially a specific general-sum bidding game over a degenerated tree (a path), where the utility in every match-the success probability-is determined by the invested resources of each party. Our model does not cover this particular game due to several differences. First, in our model the utility is only determined in the leaves rather than accumulated over the entire path; 8 More importantly, the utility in every match depends exactly on the "bids" (investments) of both parties, and both parties discard their bids (an "all-pay" auction).
Sequential auctions with budgets. Lastly and closest to our work, Huang et al. [2012] study particular bidding game, in which two agents use an initial budget to bid over identical items that are sold sequentially. This is essentially a sequential scrip auction mechanism, yet their model is not strictly a special case of ours, as they add some additional refinements. 9 While we believe that the models are very close, the focus on a particular value function (which makes the game an almost-zero-sum game) allows Huang et al. to provide an accurate characterization of the allocations under PSPE as a function of the budgets. Our results are qualitative in nature, but apply to sequential auctions with arbitrary utility functions.
Huang et al. prove that item prices decrease over time. Curiously, we observe (empirically) that prices increase.
10 One interpretation is that the result of Huang et al. is an artifact of the auction rule, as in the Poorman version the total amount of money is also decreasing in each round.
Variations
By changing the auction rules, different types of bidding games arise. For example, an all-pay auction may better describe various real world scenarios like security games, sport matches, and R&D competitions. However these games typically do not have a pure equilibrium point, and are more difficult to analyze (see Related work section for specific games that have been studied). Using a second-price rather than a first-price auction to determine the winner should not have a large effect, since in equilibrium the bids will always be very close.
An important question is whether our results still hold when the "Poorman game" version is played, i.e. when the highest bidder pays the bank rather than the other player. It seems that all proofs should go through with minor variations, but we have not yet verified this. The Poorman version has one important advantage over the Richman version-the game definition naturally extends to any number of players. It is an open question whether a Pareto-optimal PSPE exists in a binary game for more than two players, either when playing together, or when connected in a network of bilateral bargaining connections [Chakraborty et al. 2009 ]. We believe that the answer to this question is negative, since there are simple games with three players that are non-monotone.
Future Work
Other than studying the variations mentioned above, there are several questions that remain open. One natural direction is how changing the order in which items are offered (or the agenda in sequential voting) affects the induced equilibrium. While in the general case this effect can be substantial, it is possible that there are classes of valuations where all orders yield the same outcome in PSPE. For example, from Proposition 5.4 the order of issues in zero-sum voting games does not matter.
More important questions arise when non-determinism enters. For example, we conjecture that our results (both existence and optimality) also hold under random tiebreaking, and that such a randomized mechanism in fact leads to better fairness guarantees. On the other hand random tie-breaking can exponentially increase the number of possible outcomes and thus efficient computation may not be possible.
11 Finally, agents' valuations themselves may be private and sampled from some distribution, and we are interested whether similar results regarding efficiency and monotonicity apply in games without complete information.
